[This is an example only and your risk assessment should reflect the circumstances of your site]

Terrorism Risk Assessment – Small Local Festival

[This is the minimum that should be used to describe the context, more considered example of a description. It could be accompanied by maps, photographs and other supporting documents for further clarity]

Description of Event: Small music and dance festival held on agricultural land with two stages, one larger one in the open and one smaller one in a large marquee. There is a fenced perimeter within which there are two public campsites, with two vehicle access points leading to vehicle parking areas plus two pedestrian access points to the concert area, which is fenced off from the camping and parking areas. There are typically around 3,000 attendees. There is one designated food and retail site within the concert area containing approximately 10 - 12 concessions. There is a small children's playground within the concert area. A small team (4 - 5) of professional security staff are provided by our security provider but most security activities are undertaken by volunteers. There is a designated public transport hub for buses and taxis.

Responsible Person: Event Organiser

Competent Person(s): Head of Security [Events should consult with the site operator, security providers, artist liaison and other stakeholders as required. Where people have been consulted this should be recorded]

Description of Process: Joint planning between the event organisers and security providers. Engagement with the Local Authority Safety Advisory Group (SAG). Planning carried out in accordance with the Purple Guide but additionally taking account of terrorism risk.

Date of Original Assessment: January 2021

Date of this Review: July 2022

Date of Next Review: July 2023 [A review cycle should be set, with a new risk assessment being conducted prior to each event]

| What are the Threats? | Possible Harm? | Controls already in place [This is not an exhaustive list] | Decisions, further actions and responsibilities [ProtectUK should be used to identify additional measures that can be taken] | Progress reviews |
|---|--|--|---|---|
| [NaCTSO identify 6 key threats that you may to choose to base your assessment on, if you do this you should explain why you have not | [As the event organiser of the site you will need to assess the impact on your business] | All volunteer staff are briefed on security awareness. Applicable to all attack types. | Introduce temporary Hostile Vehicle Mitigations at key locations. | Review evaluation of options in 3 months. |
| included any attack types] Five of the six attack types identified in the guidance have | Each of these attack types could cause death or injury to participants and staff. In all cases | There is a procedure in place to identify concessions and approved vehicles. Applicable to attack types 1,2, 4 and 5 [Where existing measures exist, such as fire plans or Health and Safety measures, a reference to the document should be included to ensure alignment] Search and screening is in place for all access points. This is supervised by SIA licence holders and has a clear prohibited items policy Key locations on site (e.g. the stages) are monitored and patrolled by SIA accredited security staff Crowd monitoring is also carried out by volunteer stewarding staff. There is a public communication strategy covering the use of the tannoy system in emergency situations. | Assess options for and feasibility of introducing CCTV monitoring at key locations such as stages and arenas. | Review evaluation of options in 6 months. |
| site is remote and has little financial impact on the organiser computer infrastructure that could Failure to properly identify risks | and mitigating measures could lead | | Run a tabletop exercise with multi agency participants and amend security plan as appropriate. | Aim to introduce in next year – review progress in 8 months. |
| 1. Marauding Terrorist Attack (an attack by an individual or group of individuals using a gun or a bladed or blunt force weapon) | possibly prosecution. In addition, attacks of type 2 (bomb), 3 (vehicle) and 4 (fire) could cause significant damage to the stages which might result in further hazards. Note, any of the impacts of the attack types could be exacerbated if they resulted in a crowd surge. | | Include ACT e-learning and SCaN training in volunteer staff briefings. | Introduce for next festival – review progress in 10 months. |
| 2. Improvised Explosive Device (a bomb that can placed, posted or carried into or close to the site) | | | Assess whether there are sufficient SIA accredited security staff on site and how they are used and adjust as necessary. | Carry out assessment at this event – review findings in 2 months. |
| 3. Vehicle as a Weapon (deliberate use of a vehicle to kill, maim or injure people) | | | introduce deterrence communications on the event website. | Review proposals in 3 months. |
| 4. Fire as a Weapon (deliberate use of fire to kill, maim or injure people or to cause damage to the site) | | | Assess options for and feasibility of introducing road traffic control measures, including road closures, beyond the site perimeter. | Consult with local authority – review in 6 months. |

| What are the Threats? | Possible Harm? | Controls already in place [This is not an exhaustive list] | Decisions, further actions and responsibilities [ProtectUK should be used to identify additional measures that can be taken] | Progress reviews |
|--|----------------|--|--|---|
| 5. CBRN (use of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear means to poison or otherwise cause harm to people) | | There is an ambulance and para- medic team on site throughout with facilities for a triage site. | Improve access control to staff, concession and performer areas. | Develop ideas and review in 6 months. |
| Other attack methodologies in the guidance document (e.g. CYBER) have been considered but are not thought to be relevant for this site. | | | | |